Kato Koichi Official Site

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak to such a distinguished group today. Clearly, with the limited time available, it is difficult for me to give a really comprehensive tour d'horizon of Japanese foreign policy. Some might argue that I don't need much time in any case since there's clearly not much to say! Japan, after all, is widely seen as a perennial "underachiever" in international affairs. While Britain is often portrayed as a power that "punches above it's weight" in world affairs, the opposite can be said about Japan.

Although there may be some truth to this, Japan is more actively and positively engaged in the world than is widely appreciated and certainly credited. This misconception is partly Japan's fault. Frankly speaking, Japan does a terrible "Public Relations job" in explaining to the world what it is doing and why. It is no wonder then that many believe we are "passive bystanders" or "free riders" to the efforts of othersÑa view that I can assure you is very frustrating to the Japanese public. It certainly does little to make them supportive of Japan playing a more active role in the world, something I think we can all agree is a desirable goal.

Rather than give you a litany of Japan's recent foreign policy initiatives, I thought it more useful to organize my remarks around three themes that will hopefully convey to you that we are neither sitting on our hands nor do we have our heads buried in the sand. The first twoÑovercoming the past and responding to the presentÑI will touch on only very briefly while saving the bulk of my remarks to the third theme: meeting the challenges of the future

While much of the world has spent the last decade trying to heal the divisions caused by the cold war, Japan is in many respects still grappling with the legacies of the second world war. This is an extremely sensitive issue for us and our neighbors in East Asia that unfortunately continues to prevent our relations from reaching their full potential. Yet it would be wrong to characterize the situation as a static one with little progress either having been achieved or likely in the future. In fact, much has been accomplished over the last few years.

Thus, efforts to conclude a Peace Treaty with Russia continue albeit more slowly than we would like. We may not reach the 2000 deadline set by Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Yeltsin but we remain hopeful that agreement will be reached soon after. In the meantime, Japan continues to provide substantial sums in economic assistance to Russia and most recently announced further financial support to help its nuclear "clean up" in the Far East.

Relations with the Republic of Korea are arguably better now than they have been in a long time. The very successful summit with President Kim Dae Jung in Tokyo last fall that culminated in the commitment of both countries to look to the future rather than dwell on the past provides the opportunity to open a new, more fruitful chapter in Japanese-Korean relations.

In contrast, President Ziang Zemin's visit that occurred at around the same time did not provide a similar breakthrough but it was not the failure that one might have concluded from reading the press accounts at the time. If it had not followed so closely on the heels of Kim Dae Jung visit, the summit might have been viewed more positively. Agreement was reached in many areas and while continuing differences over such issues as the US-Japan Defense guidelines and theater missile defense (TMD) should not be minimised, neither should they obscure the substantial day-to-day cooperation that exists between the two countries.

Let me focus here on two issues: Japan's response to the Asian economic crisis and its contribution to regional security.

There is perhaps no other issue that better illustrates the "disconnect" between the reality and perception of Japan's foreign policy than what has been done in response to the Asian economic crisis. At a time when Japan has been going through its worst recession since the end of the war and is severely strapped for cash, approximately $80 billionÑlet me repeat that--$80 billion in assistance of various kinds has been dispensed or committed to help our Asian neighbors recover from their recent setback. This amounts to three quarters of total global bilateral aid and one and half times the total multilateral aid provided through the IMF, World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. Yet in the rush to condemn Japan for not doing more to regenerate its own economy and become the "engine of growth" for Asia, it has received little or no credit for this extraordinary assistance package.

A similar kind of disconnect exists with respect to Japan's contribution to regional security. While many are quick to argue that Japan should do more, they not only overlook what we have done but also underestimate the difficulty and sensitivity that this process represents for us. Thus, just last week Japan committed $1 billion to the KEDO projectÑnearly a quarter of the totalÑat a time when Japan's security has been recently threatened by North Korea missile launches and illegal sea incursions. The U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines were also passed recently and while some might argue that their enactment took too long or that they are too modest in scope, let us not forget the underlying reasons for this, namely Japan's constitutional constraints. Yet the same critics would probably be the first to argue that these same constraints make an invaluable contribution to regional security. In short they can't have it both ways.

Today, our most important foreign policy challenge is constructing a new order in Asia and the Pacific. Japan and the United States are the key partners in building this peaceful new order, but the other country vital to this is China. Our most important task is to reach out constructively to China and integrate it into a system reflecting appropriate rules and norms of international behavior.

Thus the relationships between Japan, China, and the United States will be decisive in the construction of the new order. These relationships can be thought of as a multi-faceted triangle. The United States and Japan are bound by their commitment to democratic values and to free market concepts. The two countries are genuinely "strategic partners," with a common interest in maintaining peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region. No other leg of this triangle can truly be called a strategic partnership

The United States and China have a different kind of relationship than had the United States with the former Soviet Union. The two countries have strong economic ties and consult and work constructively in many areas, including the North Korean problem. Many Chinese have or are studying in the United States, something totally lacking in the former US-Soviet relationship. So despite differences in many areas including TMD, human rights, and trade, there are many positive elements in the US-Chinese relationship.

Japan and China are bound together by geography and by many common cultural roots. But we also have many differences that surfaced during Jiang Zemin's visit as I indicated earlier. Some of these are historical, and others reflect the differences in our systems as well as Japanese uncertainty about China's future role. Like the United States, Japan seeks to work constructively with China, building on the positive features in our relationship.

As allies, Japan and the United States need to take into account China's sensitivities and its internal dynamics. We have a common interest in a stable China moving toward a freer economy and better and more accountable governance. However, we cannot allow China to affect our alliance or our commitment to the peaceful evolution of the international system in Asia Pacific. For the foreseeable future, an unshakable US-Japan alliance of the two largest Asia Pacific democracies is essential for peace in East Asia.

Looking at the broader context, the US-Japan alliance should not be thought of as simply a military alliance. It is a STRATEGIC alliance in the broader sense of that term. I think we have a similar vision of the world and our Asia Pacific region. But I think we have failed to develop the habits of consultation needed to develop joint political and economic strategies to move this agenda forward in a meaningful way.

At the same time, we need to develop consultative arrangements that reflect the vital importance of the trilateral US-Japan-China relationship. Unlike the relationship among North America, Europe, and Japan, we do not have a consultative mechanism on the official level such as the G7 Summit and the G7 Ministerials or the Trilateral Commission on the private level. These clearly need to be established and nurtured.

Still more broadly, is the question of Japan's future role in the world. Notwithstanding what it has been doing, pressure has been steadily mounting for Japan to play a more active international role, something it also seeks most obviously by becoming a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council. But could Japan discharge the responsibilities that go with being a Permanent Member without changing its current approach to foreign policy? For example, if a Kosovo-like situation were to develop in Asia, how would Japan respond? Japan's constitutional constraints effectively rule out any military intervention, something that our public, to say nothing of our Asian neighbors, wish to see preserved. There is a very serious question of whether financial contributions alone, as we are actually doing in Kosovo, will be regarded as sufficient by our allies particularly by our American friends.

In such an eventuality, therefore, we need to define the extent of our involvement beyond purely financial contributions, through, for example, dramatically enhancing the participation of PKO units, providing direct assistance for refugees using special non-combat units of the Self-Defense Forces, and ensuring substantial amounts of ODA for post-conflict reconstruction.

Perhaps more importantly, Japan should explore ways to make preventive diplomacy a more effective tool for the international communityÑnot just in Asia but elsewhere. In this respect, greater use of positive inducements as distinct from the usual reliance on negative sanctions, should receive serious attention.

In addition to our own soul searching about Japan's role, we have to engage our friends in Asia in a serious dialogue about the same basic issues and dilemmas. Moreover, we have to prepare the Japanese public to face the new security challenges and to support whatever initiatives are necessary to deal with them in the coming years.