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May, 1999
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The Role of Politics in a Changing Japan
At the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.
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| May 18, 1999
Remarks by Mr. Kato Koichi
Member, House of Representatives, Japan
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Thank you very much for inviting me to speak to you. As I would like to leave plenty of time for questions and answers, I will keep my opening remarks brief. I do want to cover two important areas, however. These relate to the changing nature of Japanese politics and to our foreign policy role.
For some outsiders, I believe, Japan during the last part of the 1990s has become an essentially stagnant and static society. According to these perceptions, after the economic bubble burst Japan has sunk into an extended period of slow or negative growth while failing to take the necessary reforms needed to spur renewed Japanese growth. Politically, the old system meaning the dominance of the LDP has apparently reassert itself in the form of business as usual after a brief period of political turbulence and failed reforms.
From my perspective, however, contemporary Japan is a highly dynamic
society. This society in the late 1990s has changed very significantly
from the Japan of the early 1990s or the 1980s. Far from being a "lost
decade," I believe that the decade of the 1990s will be seen by historians
as a time of significant and necessary reevaluation and change that
provided the basis for Japans recovery in the 21st century and allowed
it to take on a leadership role in the increasingly globalized world
of the 21st century.
Today, in the face of many challenges, all sectors of Japanese society
are facing questions and criticism as never before.
I believe we will see significant reform in all three sectors of what
is sometime called Japans iron triangle-- the bureaucracy, the mainstream
elements of the political world and the more privileged sectors of
industry-- as well as in their relations with each other. Iron triangle
governance is being replaced by new patterns of governance. Of course,
there is resistance from those committed to the old ways of doing
things, but change is inevitable. Let me address just those changes
taking place in the political world.
I have sometimes described Japanese politics in the period before
the end of the economic bubble as the "politics of promise." Although
there were exceptions, during most of the period of the 1950s through
the 1980s, the Japanese economy grew rapidly, and this gave us the
resources to manage the inevitable stresses and strains associated
with rapid growth. If jobs were lost in one sector, they were been
gained in other sectors. If there were slower growth internally, the
rise in the yen value gave Japanese greater international purchasing
power. But in more recent years, however, we have had to shift to
a "politics of choice," in which painful trade-offs must be made.
Politicians not only have to choose more carefully where to place
government resources, but they are also increasingly accountable individually
for their choices.
While some politicians wish for a restoration of the good old days,
I think there are many benefits to the new politics of Japan. First,
politicians are increasingly forced to grapple with public policy
issues rather than simply rely on the bureaucracy to solve most of
the problems. We have many excellent bureaucrats, but bureaucracies
in general are not well equipped to lead revolutionary change. This
is the responsibility of politicians working together with forward
thinkers in other sectors of society, including our more thoughtful
and knowledgeable bureaucrats.
One illustration of the shift of influence in Japanese politics is
the increasing tendency of the media to request interviews with political
leaders or young politicians with policy expertise such as on the
North Korean missile threat or reform of the social security system.
Until relatively recently, the media would typically seek comment
only from senior government bureaucrats.
A second positive development in the new era has been coalition politics.
You might think it strange for a senior and dedicated politician of
the LDP to say this. I believe, however, that coalition politics is
a healthy development for our party and for the Japanese political
system as a whole. In the old days, the opposite side of the coin
from LDP dominance was a group of relatively small minority parties
with virtually no expectation of participation in governance. This
made it relatively easy for them to pursue opposition politics for
its own sake without having to consider the dilemmas and responsibilities
that those actually holding power must consider. LDP dominance also
contributed to an attitude within our party of dismissing the opposition
as well as to political ossification.

In the past six years, however, coalition politics has become not
just a necessity but also the norm. For example, passage of the defense
guidelines legislation in the Lower House required cooperation among
Diet members of different parties. Politicians from diverse parties
also worked closely with NGO leaders in drafting and passing a bill
to strengthen civil society in Japan.
The LDP is prepared to work with opposition parties that want to contribute
constructively to governance and the process of change, while most
opposition parties now understand that they can no longer count on
a certain level of support simply by opposing for the sake of opposing.
I think broad based coalitions, both to address specific issues like
the Defense Guidelines, and to maintain a credible and effective government
induce a greater sense of responsibility in both the smaller parties
as well as the LDP.
Despite these positive changes in Japanese politics, it is fair to
say that many Japanese citizens feel that we politicians have not
yet provided the kind and quality of leadership that Japan needs.
It is my feeling that the election of Shintaro Ishihara as mayor of
Tokyo reflected this dissatisfaction. Some foreign writers have suggested
that Ishiharas election demonstrates the growing power of conservative,
nationalistic sentiment in Japan. I believe, however, that what appealed
to voters was not so much nationalism as the fact that Ishihara presented
a more clear cut and understandable message. He will now have to show
that he has the political and administrative skills to move forward
an agenda of action, and not just talk loosely as a social and political
critic.
I believe the Japanese people are looking to their political leadership
for an agenda of action. First and foremost, an economic agenda is
required. I do not want to discuss this at depth in this statement,
although I would certainly be willing to address your questions about
our economic dilemma and directions. Let me just say that I think
both under Prime Minister Hashimoto and current Prime Minister Obuchi
some significant steps have been taken to address the bad loan problem,
recapitalize banks, and strengthen our contribution to the Asian economies
most affected by the economic crisis. But I also believe more needs
to be done to reassure citizens with respect to pensions and health
care and restore a sense of confidence about the economic future that
will encourage renewed private consumption and productive corporate
investment.
Let me now turn to the subject of Japanese foreign policy, which has
also become much more complex in recent years. It is no coincidence,
I believe, that the end of the LDP hegemony in Japanese politics (the
so-called 1955 system) more or less coincided with the end of the
Cold War. The LDP was the party most associated with the American
alliance and the free market system. With the collapse of the Soviet
threat, new questions were raised about domestic politics in Japan
as well as its foreign policy. This produced some unexpected and positive
consequences, for example, the support of the US-Japan alliance by
the coalition government led by former Prime Minister Murayama.
Today our foreign policy challenge is not one of containing an expansionist power, as the Soviet Union was, but of developing a constructive new order in the Asia Pacific region. Japan and the United States are the key partners in building this new order, but the other country most important to this process is China. Our most important task, therefore, is to reach out constructively to China and integrate it into a system embodying the appropriate rules and norms of international behavior.
Thus the relationships between Japan, China, and the United States will be decisive in the construction of the new order. These relationships can be thought of as a multi-faceted triangle. The United States and Japan are bound by their commitment to democratic values and to free market concepts. The two countries are genuinely "strategic partners," with a common set of interests in maintaining peace and stability in Asia and the Pacific and a voluntary alliance reflecting these interests. No other leg of this triangle can be called a strategic partnership.
United States and China have a different kind of relationship than had the United States with the former Soviet Union. The two countries have strong economic ties and consult and work constructively in many areas, including the North Korean problem. Many Chinese have or are studying in the United States, something totally lacking in the former US-Soviet relationship. So despite differences in many areas including TMD, human rights, and trade, there are many positive elements in the US-Chinese relationship.
Japan and China are bound together by geography and by their many common cultural roots. But we also have many differences that arose during Jiang Zemins trip late last year to Japan. Some of these are historical, and others reflect the differences in our systems as well as Japanese uncertainty about Chinas future role. Like the United States, Japan seeks to work constructively with China to build on the positive features in our relations.
As allies, Japan and the United States need to take into account Chinas
sensitivities and its internal dynamics. We have a common interest
in a stable China moving toward a freer economy and better and more
accountable governance. However, we cannot allow China to affect our
alliance or our commitment to the peaceful evolution of the international
system in Asia Pacific. For the foreseeable future, an unshakable
US-Japan alliance of the two largest Asia Pacific democracies is essential
for peace in East Asia. Questions about North Koreas nuclear program
and its advances in missile technology demonstrate the importance
of this alliance and the guidelines legislation certainly give it
greater credibility.
Looking at the broader context, the US-Japan alliance should not be
thought of as simply a military alliance. It is a STRATEGIC alliance
in the broader sense of that term. I think we have a similar vision
of the world and our Asia Pacific region. But I think we have failed
to develop the habits of consultation needed to develop joint political
and economic strategies to move this agenda forward in a meaningful
way.
At the same time, we need to develop consultative arrangements that
reflect the vital importance of the trilateral US-Japan-China relationship.
Unlike the relationship among North America, Europe, and Japan, we
do not have a consultative mechanism on the official level such as
the G7 Summit and the G7 Ministerials or the Trilateral Commission
on the private level. These clearly need to be established and nurtured.
At this point, I would like to end my formal remarks and ask for your
comments or questions.
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